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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue No. 1. Did the District Court err in concluding that the 
proposed Seller Financing Addendum No. 1 ("SFA 1") to the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (the "REPC") between Johnson and the Wilsons was valid and enforceable 
when it had not been executed, in writing, by Johnson or delivered to the Wilsons, by 
Johnson, as required by the terms of SFA 1 ? 
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary 
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. 
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009). 
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In its Final Order and Judgment, 
the District Court ruled that the REPC was a valid and enforceable agreement. (R. 605.) 
Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R. 
610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs. 
(R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's 
Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District Court entered the 
March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson 
filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.) 
2. Issue No. 2. Assuming that SFA 1 was binding on the parties, did 
the District Court err in concluding that the Wilsons were not in breach of SFA 1, thereby 
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excusing further performance by Johnson under the REPC, when the Wilsons failed, by 
the time set for closing, to execute a promissory note and trust deed for seller financing 
consistent with the terms of SFA 1? 
Standard of Review. The District Court's decision on summary 
judgment is reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the court below." Giusti v. 
Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2; 201 P.3d 966 (Utah 2009) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
Preservation of Issue on Appeal. In its Final Order and Judgment, 
the District Court ruled that the Wilsons fully performed their obligations stated in the 
REPC and that Johnson breached the REPC. (R. 605.) Johnson filed her initial Notice of 
Appeal on February 19, 2009, within 30 days. (R. 610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the 
Wilsons filed a request for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 613-14.) The Court entered an 
Order Amending Judgment to Include Attorney's Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 
633-34.) After the District Court entered the March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's 
request for attorney's fees and costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on 
April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.) 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The statutes of central importance to this appeal, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-1 and 
-3, are set out verbatim in Addendum A and Addendum B. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs, Scott and Tiffany Wilson (the "Wilsons") filed their Complaint 
against Defendant Angela Johnson ("Johnson") on March 19, 2007, alleging that Johnson 
had breached the terms of a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "REPC") to sell real 
property located in St. George, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 1-7.) The District Court 
entered an interim order, the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, on August 11, 
2008 in favor of the Wilsons finding that an unsigned seller financing addendum was 
binding on Johnson. (R. 583-89.) The District Court then entered a Final Order and 
Judgment on January 21, 2009 in favor of the Wilsons, granting a second motion for 
summary judgment filed by the Wilsons, and finding that Johnson had breached the terms 
of the seller financing addendum and REPC by not conveying the Property to the 
Wilsons. (R. 603-07.) Johnson filed her initial Notice of Appeal on February 19, 2009, 
within 30 days. (R. 610-12.) On March 3, 2009, the Wilsons filed a request for 
attorney's fees and costs. (R. 613-14.) The Court entered an Order Amending Judgment 
to Include Attorney's Fees and Costs on March 6, 2009. (R. 633-34.) After the District 
Court entered the March 6, 2009 order granting Wilson's request for attorney's fees and 
costs, Johnson filed an amended Notice of Appeal on April 3, 2009. (R. 644-46.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Angela Johnson, ("Johnson") is the owner of property located at 704 South 
Anasazi Circle, Washington, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 584.) 
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2. Johnson listed the Property for sale on or about December 1, 2006. The 
Multiple Listing Service listing for the Property stated an asking price of $1,300,000.00 
and stated that "Owner finance available at 30 yr fixed 4.9% interest. Call listing agent 
regarding terms." (R. 102-03.) 
3. On or about January 6, 2007, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson (the 
"Wilsons") offered to purchase the Property from Johnson, offering to pay $1,100,000 
with the Wilsons paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, for a total of 
$100,000 down and Johnson seller-financing $990,000. (R. 584.) 
4. The Wilsons' offer (the "REPC") was made on a standard Real Estate 
Purchase Contract form approved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate. (R. 584.) 
5. The initial offer specified that the purchase price would be paid through 
seller financing and contained the following language: 
There [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing additional 
terms. If there are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated 
into this Contract by this reference. [ ] Addendum No. 1 [X] Seller 
Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption 
Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in 
some transactions this disclosure is required by Law) [ ] Lead-Based 
Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by 
Law) [X] Other (specify) Notice of Interest Addendum. 
(R. 584.) 
6. Section 3 of the REPC provides as follows: 
"Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been 
completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each other or 
to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, . . . (b) 
any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for 
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the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to 
the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. 
(R. 25, 312.) 
7. Section 14 of the REPC offered by the Wilsons on January 8, 2007, 
provides as follows: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of 
the parties." (R. 27, 314.) 
8. Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows: "'Acceptance' occurs when 
Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the offer or 
counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party 
or to the other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required." 
(R. 28, 315.) 
9. Along with the REPC the Wilsons included a seller financing addendum 
("SFA 1") that specified that Johnson would provide seller financing for the Property. (R. 
31-32,584.) 
10. Every addendum to the REPC, including SFA 1, contains the following 
provision: "[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ ] AM [ ] PM Mountain Time 
on (Date), to accept the terms of this SELLER FINANCING 
ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. Unless so 
accepted, the offer as set forth in this SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM shall lapse." 
(R. 309.) 
5 
11. SFA 1 provided, among other things, that $990,000.00 of the purchase 
price would be financed by Johnson at a rate of 4.9% with monthly payments of 
$5,250.00 per month beginning on May 1, 2007. SFA 1 had an offer expiration deadline 
of 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.) 
12. On or about January 8, 2007, Johnson executed a counteroffer, listed as 
Addendum No. 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000.00 for the purchase of the Property and 
"requiring a 72 hour time clause/option to keep the house on the market." (R. 585.) 
13. Addendum No. 2 specifically states: 
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any 
provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all 
prior addenda and counteroffers, not modified by this ADDENDUM 
shall remain the same. 
(R. 585.) 
14. Johnson's counteroffer made no mention of SFA 1, and made no changes to 
any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 12 above. (R. 585.) 
15. On that same date, the Wilsons executed Addendum No. 3, counter-
offering the following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000; (b) in lieu of 72 hour clause, 
settlement to be 2-23-07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released 
to seller on 2-10-07; and (d) all other terms and conditions to remain the same. (R. 585.) 
16. On the same date, Johnson signed both the REPC and Addendum No. 3, but 
did not sign SFA 1. (R. 585.) 
6 
17. Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 1 nor did she sign SFA 
1. Neither Johnson nor her agent expressed to the Wilsons or their agent consent to SFA 
1 or its terms. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.) 
18. Nearly one month after the REPC and Addendum No. 3 were signed by 
Johnson, on February 8, 2007, Johnson received a second proposed Seller Financing 
Addendum from the Wilsons ("SFA 2"). SFA 2 did not specify the amount of seller 
financing but offered the same interest rate as SFA 1 and listed the monthly payment as 
$5,250.00 per month. However, SFA 2 then specified the monthly payment amount as 
"P&I $5493.02 per month. See amortization schedule for principle [sic] and interest 
breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00 per month. 2 Months taxed 
[sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." Again, the proposed terms were 
not satisfactory to Johnson. Johnson never agreed to the terms contained in SFA 2 nor 
did she sign SFA 2 or communicate acceptance of its terms to the Wilsons or their agent. 
(R. 104, 322-23.) 
19. On or about February 10, 2007, Johnson received the $20,000 earnest 
money deposit check and negotiated it. (R. 586.) 
20. The Settlement Deadline for the Wilsons' purchase of the Property was 
February 23, 2007, pursuant to Addendum No. 3. (R. 104, 320.) 
21. On or about February 23, 2007, at approximately 12:00 p.m. Johnson hand-
delivered a proposed Seller Financing Addendum to the closing office, Atlas Title, on 
terms acceptable to Johnson at the reduced purchase price of $1,150,000.00, for 
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execution by the Wilsons ("SFA 3")- SFA 3 had an offer acceptance date of February 23, 
2007 at 5:00 p.m. Johnson never received an executed copy of SFA 3 from the Wilsons 
or their agent. (R. 104,325-26.) 
22. In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from the Wilsons' initial offer 
to the final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or SFA 1, 
which stated that Johnson would finance $990,000 as the seller and that the Wilsons 
would pay a total of $110,000 as a down payment. (R. 585.) 
23. By close of business on February 23, 2007, the date set for closing, the 
Wilsons tendered a total of $118,625.42 (calculated as the earnest money deposit of 
$20,000.00 delivered to Johnson on or before February 10, 2007, plus $98,625.42 
delivered to the closing office on February 23, 2007) and a promissory note and trust 
deed for seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00. The HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement which the Wilsons executed and delivered to the closing office provided for 
seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000. (R. 334, 255-56, 258.) 
24. None of the REPC, SFA 1, SFA 2, or SFA 3 provide for seller financing in 
the amount of $1,035,000.00. Neither Johnson nor her agent, Meri Crandall, agreed to or 
communicated agreement to that amount of seller financing to the Wilsons, Mr. Larkin, 
or the closing office. (R. 334, 274.) 
25. On February 23, 2007, Johnson went to the title company and signed most 
of the closing documents, but did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement showing 
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seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the transaction did not close. (R. 
604.) 
26. At no time did Johnson or the Wilsons provide the closing office with a 
document signed by all the parties which provides for seller financing in the amount of 
$1,035,000.00. (R.255.) 
27. Following the settlement deadline of February 23, 2007, Wilsons withdrew 
the sum of $98,625.42 from the closing office. (R. 256.) 
28. On February 26, 2007 (three days after the settlement deadline had 
expired), the Wilsons caused a Notice of Interest in Real Property (the "NOI") to be 
recorded against the Property in the official records of Washington County, Utah. (R. 
328, 334.) 
29. Nowhere in the Wilsons' initial offer, any other documents signed by the 
parties or even in the unexecuted SFA 1 and SFA 2 is there any reference nor did the 
parties ever discuss or agree to seller financing of a specific percentage of the total 
purchase price (90% or otherwise). (R. 103-04, 110-19, 123-26.) 
30. According to the custom and practice of the Utah residential real estate 
industry, both parties to a standardized REPC must execute and accept an addendum to 
the REPC in order for the terms of the addendum to be included in the purchase and sale 
transaction. This requirement of dual execution and mutual acceptance enables an 
escrow officer and real estate agent to know which addenda represent the agreement of 
the parties and are to be included in the closing. (R. 445, 448.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in ruling that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson since 
Johnson did not accept SFA 1 in accordance with its stated terms. In order to accept SFA 
1, thereby making it binding on both Johnson and the Wilsons, Johnson was required to 
sign SFA 1 and communicate to the Wilsons that SFA 1 had been accepted. Johnson did 
neither. By its own express terms, the Wilsons offer for seller financing, on the terms set 
forth in SFA 1, lapsed when it was not accepted by Johnson. 
Assuming SFA 1 was enforceable against Johnson, the Wilsons breached its 
terms. SFA 1 provided for seller financing in the amount of $990,000.00. The Wilsons 
never executed a promissory note or trust deed or other seller financing document in the 
amount of $990,000.00. Instead, at closing, the Wilsons tendered seller financing 
documents in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and insisted Johnson close. Johnson never 
agreed to seller financing in the amount of $1,035,000.00 and the Wilsons, not Johnson, 
breached the terms of the REPC and SFA 1. The Wilsons' breach excused any further 
performance from Johnson. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT SFA 1 WAS 
BINDING ON JOHNSON SINCE IT WAS NEVER ACCEPTED BY 
JOHNSON. 
A. Johnson Did Not Accept the Terms of SFA 1 as Required by Its Express 
Terms. 
In its Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment entered August 11, 2008, the 
Court concluded that SFA 1, which was offered to Johnson by the Wilsons in conjunction 
with the REPC, was binding upon Johnson even though she never signed SFA 1 nor 
communicated her assent. (R. 586-87.) The Wilsons set a deadline for SFA 1 to be 
accepted by 5:00 p.m. on January 8, 2007. (R. 309.) SFA 1 stated that it could only be 
accepted by Johnson "in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC" and 
that "[ujnless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse." (R. 
309) (emphasis added). Section 23 of the REPC provides as follows: 
"Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer 
of the other; (a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate 
acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's 
agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
(R. 315) (emphasis added). At no time did Johnson sign SFA 1, nor did she or her agent 
communicate to the Wilsons or their agent that SFA 1 had been signed or that Johnson 
had accepted the terms of SFA 1. (R. 103, 274, 308-09.) 
SFA 1 constituted an offer and the manner of acceptance of the offer was clearly 
described by its express terms. "When an offer specifies the manner in which it must be 
accepted, it can only be accepted in the specified manner. Otherwise mutual assent is 
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lacking, and no contract is formed." Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. David 
E. Ross II, 849 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993); see also Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders 
Trust, 1999 UT App 159, *2 ("[W]hen the terms of a contract provide for the method of 
acceptance, acceptance can only be effectuated by compliance with the prescribed 
method") (unpublished opinion). Johnson failed to sign SFA 1 or otherwise 
communicate her acceptance of its terms to the Wilsons or their agent by 5:00 p.m. on 
January 8, 2007 (the offer acceptance deadline chosen by the Wilsons). Accordingly, 
SFA 1 lapsed and did not become part of the REPC when Johnson accepted Addendum 
No. 3. 
B. The Wilsons' Conduct Demonstrates That They Understood that SFA 1 
Had Lapsed and That the Parties Had Not Reached an Agreement 
Regarding Seller Financing. 
The Wilsons' conduct after the lapse of SFA 1 demonstrates that they understood 
that SFA 1 had lapsed and was not part of the REPC. On February 8, 2007, the Wilsons 
sent to Johnson a second Seller Financing Addendum, SFA 2, which did not specify the 
amount of seller financing and which detailed a different monthly payment amount than 
SFA 1. (R. 104, 322-23.) Where SFA 1 simply stated that payments would be $5,250.00 
per month, SFA 2 stated "P&I $5493.02 per month. See amortization schedule for 
principle [sic] and interest breakdown. Taxes: $228.07 per month. Insurance: $154.00 
per month. 2 Months taxed [sic] and insurance to be deposited in impound account." (R. 
322.) Further, SFA 1 required the Wilsons to deliver the following to Johnson or the 
closing office by the close of business on February 23, 2007: (a) a promissory note in the 
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amount of $990,000.00 and (b) the sum of $160,000.00 (representing the difference 
between the total purchase price and the portion of the purchase price to be seller 
financed pursuant to the amounts set forth in SFA 1). (R. 308, 320.) The Wilsons did not 
deliver the required funds and documents by February 23, 2007; instead they delivered 
$118,625.42 ($20,000.00 in earnest money plus $98,625.42 at closing on February 23, 
2007) and a promissory note in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 334, 256, 586.) The 
Wilsons' own conduct—which is entirely inconsistent with the stated terms of SFA 1— 
demonstrates that SFA 1 was not agreed to by the parties and was not incorporated into 
the REPC. 
C. Enforcement of SFA 1 Would Violate the Statute of Frauds and Fail to 
Give Effect to the REPC's Provisions Regarding Amendment. 
The REPC is within the Utah Statute of Frauds. "[A]n offer to purchase [real 
estate] when accepted creates an interest in real estate and is within the statute of frauds." 
Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423-24 (Utah 1986). Section 25-5-1 of Utah Code 
Annotated (Sections 25-5-1 et seq. referred to as the "Utah Statute of Frauds") provides 
in relevant part: 
No estate or interest in real property,. . . shall be created, granted, assigned, 
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by 
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same. 
Section 25-5-3 of Utah Code Annotated further provides in relevant part: "Every 
contract . . . for the sale, of any lands, or any interests in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
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whom the lease or sale is to be made." The Utah Supreme Court stated in Golden Key 
Realty, Inc. v. PJ. Manias, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985) that "[t]he rule is well settled 
in Utah that if an original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent 
agreement which modifies the original written agreement must also satisfy the 
requirements of the statute of frauds to be enforceable." Each addendum to the REPC, 
including SFA 1, represents a subsequent agreement which modifies the REPC. 
The express terms of the REPC are consistent with the Utah Statute of Frauds. 
Section 14 of the REPC states: "This Contract cannot be changed except by written 
agreement of the parties." (R. 314.) As mentioned above, each addendum to the REPC 
requires the offeree to accept the offer/addendum by signing the addendum and 
transmitting her acceptance of the same to the offeror. The terms of the REPC cannot be 
modified or added upon except through a subsequent written agreement signed by the 
parties. 
In Williams, the seller under a real estate purchase contract failed to accept an 
offer to purchase property owned by her and her husband as joint tenants by the offer 
acceptance deadline set by the buyer. The seller later attempted to ratify her husband's 
timely acceptance of the offer. The Utah Supreme Court held that the seller's attempt to 
accept the offer (or ratify her husband's prior acceptance) after the offer had lapsed was 
ineffectual. Id. at 424. The Court stated that the seller's theory of "open-ended 
ratification . . . would play havoc with the laws of offer and acceptance." Id. 
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Likewise, the Wilsons' argument, and the District Court's ruling, that a party to a 
real estate purchase contract can be bound to the terms of an addendum which she has not 
signed in accordance with the terms of the addendum would "play havoc" with the laws 
of offer and acceptance in the context of residential real estate purchases. Under the 
Wilsons' theory of the law, parties to a residential real estate purchase contract, their 
agents, and closing offices would be uncertain as to which addenda were binding and 
which were not. While the Wilsons' position would lead to chaos, the express terms of 
the REPC and addenda and relevant Utah statutory and case law lend themselves to 
clarity, consistency, and the mutual assent of the parties. 
Finally, "[a] court must attempt to construe the contract so as to 'harmonize and 
give effect to all of [its] provisions.'" Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, <|[ 
30, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). To adopt the Wilsons' position and affirm the 
District Court's ruling would be to render superfluous the provisions in each addendum 
which require acceptance by a certain deadline and in accordance with the "acceptance" 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC. It would also render superfluous Section 14 of the 
REPC, requiring amendments to be in writing. Finally, it would render the acceptance, 
rejection, and counter-offer provision and signature block on each addendum superfluous, 
since the offeree could be bound by the terms of the addendum without ever signing it. 
In sum, the District Court erred in finding that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WILSONS 
DID NOT BREACH THE REPC SINCE THE WILSONS FAILED TO 
EXECUTE DOCUMENTS OR PROVIDE THE CONSIDERATION 
REQUIRED BY SFA 1. 
A. The Wilsons Breached the REPC and SFA 1 By Failing to Execute a 
Promissory Note and Trust Deed in the Amount of $990,000.00. 
Johnson did not breach the terms of the REPC when she refused to sign the HUD-
1 Settlement Statement on February 23, 2007. The REPC provided for seller financing in 
the amount for $990,000.00. (R. 585.) Likewise, SFA 1, which the District Court found 
to be binding on Johnson even though she did not sign it or deliver it to Wilsons, clearly 
stated that the amount for seller financing was $990,000.00. (R. 585.) The Wilsons have 
not produced any document signed by the parties which states a different amount of seller 
financing or any other agreement executed by Johnson recognizing a different amount of 
seller financing. Therefore, the REPC and SFA 1, assuming it was binding on the parties, 
required the Wilsons, as buyers, to tender a promissory note and trust deed in the amount 
of $990,000.00 and cash in the amount of $140,000.00 (calculated as the total purchase 
price of $1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20,000.00, less seller financing in 
the amount of $990,000.00) to Johnson or the closing office by close of business on 
February 23, 2007. Instead, the Wilsons tendered $98,625.42 in cash along with a 
promissory note and trust deed in the amount of $1,035,000.00. (R. 586.) Johnson never 
agreed to seller financing in this amount. It is the Wilsons who breached the terms of the 
REPC and SFA 1, not Johnson. 
16 
The Utah Supreme Court in Aquagen Int'l, Inc. v. Calrae Trust, 972 P.2d 411,414 
(Utah 1998) stated the well established rule that: 
When one party to a valid contract commits an 'uncured material failure' in 
its performance of the contract, the non-failing party is relieved of its duty 
to continue to perform under the contract. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, § 237 (1981). This general rule is based on the principle that 
where performances are to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, 
each party is entitled to the assurance that he will not be called upon to 
perform his remaining duties of performance with respect to the expected 
exchange if there has already been an uncured material failure of 
performance by the other party. 
Likewise, in Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280-81 (Utah 1972), the Utah 
Supreme Court concluded that: 
The law regarding the rights under a contract of one who first breaches it is 
set out in 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 365, as follows: As a rule, a party first 
guilty of a substantial or material breach of contract cannot complain if the 
other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can neither insist on 
performance by the other party nor maintain an action against the other 
party for a subsequent failure to perform. . . . It has also been said that 
where a contract is not performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach 
is generally the one upon whom rests all the liability for the 
nonperformance. 
The Wilsons' failure to tender the agreed upon amount of cash and a promissory note for 
the required amount of seller financing constituted a material breach or failure to perform 
under the REPC and excused Johnson from further performance. 
B. The REPC and SFA 1 Do Not Provide for Ninety Percent Seller 
Financing. 
The Wilsons argued below, and the District Court impliedly found, that the 
Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA because the REPC and SFA 1 were intended 
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to provide that Johnson seller finance ninety percent (90%) of the purchase price of the 
Property. (R. 552-53, 586-87.) The only evidence that the Wilsons offered in support of 
this contention was Scott Wilson's unexpressed intent. (R. 356.) Johnson disputed that 
she ever had this intent and the Wilsons themselves do not contend that they ever even 
spoke with Johnson regarding this version of the REPC and SFA 1. There is no 
document agreed to by Johnson or even prepared by Wilsons expressing this intent. The 
REPC and SFA 1 are clear on their face—Johnson is to provide seller financing in the 
amount of $990,000.00. The District Court's wholesale rewrite of the REPC and SFA 1 
is inconsistent with the statute of frauds and should be reversed. Johnson did not breach 
the terms of the REPC or SFA 1. Rather the Wilsons did in failing to tender the proper 
amounts. 
At its core, the Wilsons' contention is that the $50,000.00 gap between the 
purchase price initially offered by the Wilsons ($1,100,000.00) and the purchase price 
ultimately agreed to ($1,150,000.00), which is not addressed in any of the documentation 
surrounding this transaction, should be absorbed by Johnson as part of "seller financing." 
This contention, which was accepted by the District Court, is inconsistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). In Reed, the 
Utah Supreme Court, while interpreting a contract for the purchase of real property for 
$70,000.00 upon "terms to be arranged," stated that "[w]here there is no agreement 
concerning the terms of payment this Court will alleviate the uncertainty of this aspect of 
the contract by requiring full payment at the time of the tender of the conveyance." Id. at 
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1378-79 (emphasis added). This principle has subsequently been relied on and applied 
by the Utah Court of Appeals: "More troubling is the lack of any detail concerning the 
seller financing in the agreement. However, such uncertainty does not invalidate a 
contract. Rather, a requirement of full cash payment at closing will be implied'' Dunn v. 
Prichard, 2001 UT App 252, *1 n.l (citing Reed, 610 P.2d at 1378-79) (emphasis added) 
(unpublished opinion). 
In this case, again assuming that SFA 1 is enforceable even though it was never 
"accepted" by Johnson according to SFA 1 's own terms, the principles articulated in 
Reed and Dunn, as well as the structure of the REPC1, require the uncertainty regarding 
the allocation of the additional $50,000 to be resolved in Johnson's favor by requiring the 
Wilsons to pay $140,000 in cash at closing (calculated as the total purchase price of 
$1,150,000.00 less Earnest Money Deposit of $20,000.00, less seller financing in the 
amount of $990,000.00). The Wilsons only paid $98,625.42 in cash at closing. (R. 586.) 
Consequently, the Wilsons failed to tender the required cash payment of $140,000 at 
closing and thereby materially breached the REPC. This material breach excused any 
1
 Paragraph 2 of the REPC, which sets forth the purchase price for the subject property, 
specifies the terms of payment in paragraph 2.1 by subtracting each type of payment from 
the total purchase price. (R. 24, 311.) Therefore, from the total purchase price of 
$1,150,000, the REPC first subtracts any earnest money paid. (R. 24, 311.) Then, the 
REPC subtracts any amounts provided by a new loan, the buyer's assumption of an 
existing loan, seller financing, and/or any "other" payment. (R. 24, 311.) Finally, after 
all other methods of payment have been allocated, the "Balance of Purchase Price [is 
due] in Cash at Settlement." (R. 24, 311.) This structure of the REPC supports the 
principle stated in Reed and Dunn because all amounts required for full payment of the 
purchase price not otherwise provided for in the REPC are due in cash at the time of 
closing. 
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obligation Johnson had to convey the Property or to render any further performance 
under the REPC. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court's entry of summary judgment in favor 
of the Wilsons because it erred in concluding that (i) SFA 1 was binding on Johnson even 
though she never signed it in the manner specified by the REPC for it to be accepted and 
(ii) the Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA 1 when they failed to tender a 
promissory note and trust deed for seller financing in the amounts specified in SFA 1. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2009. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Andrew V. Collins 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this l(ci day of October, 2009,1 caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be served via U.S. Mail, 
first-class postage prepaid, on the following: 
Michael F. Leavitt 
Durham Jones & Pinegar 
192 East 200 North 
St. George, Utah 84770 
jfadKt 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann. §25-5-1 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 
C. Phelps v. Jean Smith Sanders Trust, 1999 UT App 159 (unpublished) 
D. Dunn v. Prichard, 2001 UT App 252 (unpublished) 
E. Real Estate Purchase Contract (R. 24-29, 111-16) 
F. Seller Financing Addendum 1 (R. 118-19) 
G. Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment (R. 583-89) 
H. Final Order and Judgment (R. 603-07) 
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Addendum A 
Page 1 
LEXSTATUCA 25-5-1 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. * 
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/2009); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) * 
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CASES) * 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (2009) 
§ 25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over 
or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 &C.L. 1907, §§ 1974, 2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874, 5811; RS. 1933 &C. 1943,33-5-1. 
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LEXSTAT UCA 25-5-3 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright 2009 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2009 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION. * 
* ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2009 UT 38 (06/19/2009); 2009 UT App 162 (06/18/2009) * 
* AND JUNE 1, 2009 (FEDERAL CASES) * 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (2009) 
§ 25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, 
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
HISTORY: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2463; C.L. 1917, § 5813; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-5-3. 
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LexisNexis* 
LEXSEE 1999 UT APP 159 
Daniel J. Phelps, Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-appellant, v. Jean Smith Sanders 
Trust, Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-appellee. 
Case No. 971575-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
1999 UT App 159; 1999 Utah App. LEXIS 292 
May 13,1999, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-
CATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Second District, Farmington 
Department. The Honorable Jon M. Memmott 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed and remanded. 
COUNSEL: Craig S. Cook and George B. Handy, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Douglas M. Durbano and Stanley L. Ballif, Layton, for 
Appellee 
JUDGES: Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding 
Judge. WE CONCUR: Russell W. Bench, Judge, Nor-
man H. Jackson, Judge 
OPINION BY: Pamela T. Greenwood 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Jackson. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTEROFFER 
Both parties agree that at the June 26, 1995, meeting the 
time for acceptance of plaintiffs offer had lapsed, result-
ing in Sanders's signature on the contract becoming a 
counteroffer. See Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 
185, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1971) ("An offeror who 
receives an acceptance which is too late or which is oth-
erwise defective, cannot at his election regard it as valid. 
The late or defective acceptance is a counter-offer which 
must in turn be accepted by the original offeror in order 
to create a contract."). Therefore, the issue is whether 
Phelps accepted Sanders's counteroffer by initialing the 
contract. Whether a contract [*2] exists is question of 
law that we review for correctness. See Hughes & Sons 
Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct App. 1992). 
Sanders correctly argues that when the terms of a con-
tract provide for the method of acceptance, acceptance 
can only be effectuated by compliance with the pre-
scribed method. SeeCrane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 
11A P.2d 3, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("In making an offer, 
the offeror may specify the manner in which the offer 
must be accepted. If the offer is not accepted in the spe-
cified manner, mutual assent is lacking and no contract is 
formed."). In this case, the contract required the parties 
to the contract to "sign the offer or counter offer where 
noted to indicate acceptance." (Emphasis added.) The 
contract also included a signature line at the bottom of 
the document. Therefore, we must determine whether 
initialing the contract constituted a signature for purposes 
of accepting the counteroffer. 
In Jaffe v. Gibbons, 290 S.C. 468, 351 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1986), the court addressed the question of 
whether initialing a contract for the sale of real estate 
was tantamount to an acceptance of [*3] a counteroffer 
when the contract required a signature for acceptance. 
See id. at 346. In holding that there was a meeting of the 
minds such that a valid contract was formed, the court 
noted that generally when two parties to a transaction 
both sign a document, that document becomes a valid, 
enforceable contract. See id. at 345. Under circumstances 
similar to this case, the court held that "when [the buyer] 
initialed the [changes to the contract], he accepted the 
counter offer, thereby creating a binding contract." Id. at 
346. Furthermore, the court held that although the buyer 
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"only initialed and did not sign his full name to the dele-
tions, the initials, in our opinion, amount to both a sign-
ing and an acceptance by Jaffe of the counter offer " Id 
see also 17A Am Jur 2d Contracts § 188 (1991) (in-
itialing a contract is as effective in binding a party there-
to as a full signature) 
In this case, the trial court found, and neither party dis-
putes, that each party understood the terms of the con-
tract and mtended to enter mto a bmdmg contract 
Therefore, we conclude that Phelps's signature via his 
initials on the contract [*4] constituted a valid accep-
tance of Sanders's counteroffer l 
1 We find no merit in Sanders's argument that 
Phelps's signature was not placed in the correct 
location and thus rendered the contract invalid 
See PIO v John B Gilliland Constr Inc 276 
Ore 975, 560 P 2d 247, 250 (Ore 1976) (holdmg 
signature placed anywhere on a contract is suffi-
cient to authenticate it) 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Utah's statute of frauds provides that all interests in real 
property "shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered 
or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or 
by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same " Utah Code Ann § 25-5-1 (1998), see also 
Commercial Union Assocs v Clayton, 863 P 2d 29, 33 
(Utah Ct App 1993) (" a document to be enforceable 
under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the 
party granting the conveyance"' (emphasis add-
ed)(quoting [*5] Williams v Singleton, 723 P 2d 421, 
424 (Utah 1986))), petition for cert filed, 231 Utah Adv 
Rep 24 (Utah 1994) 
The contract at issue is clearly a sufficient writing me-
morializing the parties' intent to convey real property 
Furthermore, the contract is signed by Sanders - the 
party conveying the land and the party against whom 
enforcement is sought, therefore, the contract in this case 
satisfies the statute of frauds 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Phelps argues the trial court erred in refusing to award 
him attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party under 
the contract However, Phelps did not raise the issue of 
attorney fees under the contract either in his complamt or 
motion for summary judgment and thus waived his right 
to attorney fees below See Lee v Barnes, 977 P 2d 550, 
1999 UT App 126, 367 Utah Adv Rep 40, 41 (Utah Ct 
App 1999) (holding party waived right to attorney fees 
because "attorney fees were never mentioned at oral ar-
gument" and party failed "to properly address the issue to 
the trial court") Nevertheless, Phelps is entitled to rea-
sonable attorney fees incurred on appeal, and we remand 
to the trial court for a determination [*6] and award of 
these fees 
Finally, Phelps argues that he should be awarded at-
torney fees under section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code 
because Sanders's defense was in bad faith See Utah 
Code Ann § 78-27-56 (1996 & Supp 1998) We disag-
ree Trial courts are accorded broad discretion in award-
ing attorney fees based on an opposmg party's bad faith 
See Valcarce v Fitzgerald, 961 P 2d 305, 316 (Utah 
1997) Because Sanders has failed to show the trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees to 
Phelps under section 78-27-56, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of attorney fees on this basis 
Affirmed and remanded 
Pamela T Greenwood, Associate Presidmg Judge 
WE CONCUR 
Russell W Bench, Judge 
Norman H Jackson, Judge 
Addendum D 
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LexisNexis* 
LEXSEE2001UTAPP252 
Douglas W. Dunn and Ruth E. Dunn, husband and wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. 
Agnes Prichard; Seven Prichard; Jean S. Kump aka Wanda Jean Kump, trustee of 
the Jean S. Kump Trust; and Delbert Keith Kump and Jodi Sue Dembowski, per-
sonal representatives of the Shirl R. Kump Estate, Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 20000823-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2001 UT App 252; 2001 Utah App. LEXIS 412 
August 30, 2001, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLI-
CATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Eighth District, Vernal Depart-
ment. The Honorable John R. Anderson 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part; reversed in part 
and remanded. 
COUNSEL: Daniel S. Sam, Vernal, for Appellants 
Clark B. Allred and Clark A. McClellan, Vernal, for 
Appellees 
JUDGES: Gregory K. Orme, Judge. WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge, William 
A. Thome, Jr., Judge 
OPINION BY: Gregory K. Orme 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne. 
ORME, Judge: 
The lack of earnest money, omission of a closing date, 
and identification of other terms as "N.A." do not render 
the contract unenforceable in this case, for essentially the 
reasons argued by appellants. l Therefore, the trial court 
erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judg-
ment. However, it does not follow that appellants are 
entitled to summary judgment. 
1 More troubling is the lack of any detail con-
cerning the seller financing called for in the 
agreement. However, such uncertainty does not 
invalidate a contract. Rather, a requirement of full 
cash payment at closing will be implied. See Reed 
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Utah 1980). 
[*2] In their motion for summary judgment, ap-
pellees contended that appellants led them to believe that 
what they signed was merely a preliminary document 
appellants could use to help determine if financing could 
be obtained and was not intended to be a binding con-
tract for the sale of real estate. Appellants challenge this 
contention factually, but also argue that extrinsic evi-
dence regarding the intention of the parties and their 
discussions leading up to the signing of the document is 
not admissible to vary the terms of an integrated con-
tract. 
While this precept is generally true, Utah courts 
have long held that "parole evidence is admissible to 
show the circumstances under which the contract was 
made or the purpose for which the writing was ex-
ecuted." Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 
(Utah 1985). See also Berkeley Bank for Coops, v. Mei-
bos, 607 P.2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980)(indicating parole 
evidence was properly admitted to show that signed 
notes were represented as being "just a formality" in ob-
taining loans and not intended by defendants to be con-
tracts); Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118, 122 
(Utah 1948) [*3] (explaining parole evidence is ad-
missible to show that what appears to be a warranty deed 
was actually given only for security purposes). 
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Particularly insightful is the case of Union Bank v. 
Swenson, where a unanimous Utah Supreme Court held 
that allegations, such as those made by the appellees in 
this case, "raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the parties assented to the writing as a final 
statement of the intended agreement or executed it for 
some other purpose." 707 P.2d at 666. The Union Bank 
Court further explained that "parole evidence, indeed any 
relevant evidence, is admissible" to assist a court in de-
termining whether a writing was intended by the parties 
to be a fully integrated agreement. Id. at 665. 
Thus, appellees' contention in this regard is not fo-
reclosed as a matter of law. The relevant material facts 
are in dispute, however, meaning the claim cannot be 
resolved on summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of 
appellants' summary judgment motion, reverse the trial 
court's grant of appellees' summary judgment motion, 
and remand for trial or such other [*4] proceedings as 
may now be appropriate. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge 
William A. Thorne, Jr., Judge 
Addendum E 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This is a legally binding contract Utah law requires real estate licensees to use this form Buyer and Seller however may agree to alter or 
delete its provisions or to use a different form If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buver Smt t ft Tiffany Wilson °£?f s r^^£ h a s e the Pr°Per ty 
described below and hereoy delivers to the Brokerage as Earnest Money, the amount of S__U.UQQ.00 in the form of 
C h e c k which upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23) 
shall be deposited in accordance with state law 
Received by on (Date) 
(Signature of agent/broker acknowledges receipt of Earnest Money) 
Brokerage F x i t R e d R o c k R e a l t y Phone Number 4 3 5 - 9 8 6 - 0 2 2 0 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
1 . P R O P E R T Y : 7Q4 5 ^NAS^ZI Cic-'e Wasrtnc on UT 3^730 
also described as Indian Oaks Subdivision Lot #24 
City of W a s h i n g t o n County of W a s h i n g t o n State of Utah Zip 8 4 7 8 0 (the ' Property") 
1.1 Included Items Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to 
the Property plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment, ceiling fans, water heater, built-in appliances, light 
fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains, draperies and rods, window and door screens, storm doors and windows, 
window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, satellite dishes and system, permanently affixed carpets, automatic 
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s), fencing, and trees and shrubs The following items shall also be 
included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title 
Ail items outlined m MLS arofle 'o a(sc include aU Ixtures bu»l(-<n „cdreU*enter«a<r>rreot centers electronic I recreattooat ?Quiomer( on prermas al effer cate that -r\av or ma/ <\m se n he MLS profile 
1.2 Excluded Items The following items are excluded from this sale 
All mmovahlfi furniture such as heris, linpns, flatware tahlfis ft r.hairs.. 
1.3 Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale 
NA _ _ _ 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $ 1 . 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
2.1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows 
S 2 0 , 0 0 0 0 0 (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract, THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$__ (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2 3 Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loans [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ ] VA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) 
If an FHA/VA loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum 
If the loan is to include any particular terms then check below and give details 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS 
S_ (c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
$ 9 9 0 T 0 0 0 . 0 0 (d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
$ (e) Other (specify). 
$ 9 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 (f) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement 
S i 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PURCHASE PRICE Total of lines (a) through (f) 
2 2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable 
loan(s) referenced in Section 2 1(b) or (c) (the "Loan") This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition * 
(D) I x l Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan 
Section 2 3 does not apply } / r * 
Page 1 of 6 pages Seller's initials Date Buyer's lnitials_^_________ Date (/v/& ~7 
f T S u v e S l e s No later than the Loan Application & Fee Deadline referenced ,n Section 24(a) Buyer shall 
i f ( 1 i o l n "i nin ADD icat.on" occurs only when Buyer has (i) completed signed and delivered to the lender (the 
?,PPPyH A the S a l toa^aSSS^a«31^ertaUon required by the Lender and (,.) Pa,d all loan application fees as 
requSd b j m e S n 6 e T B^erlSees to d.hgently work to obtain the Loan Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any 
a««t-onal ^ ^ ^ ^ X ^ S i ^ S n ^ d If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
b) p r o c e ° u r e " 'u "7
 f L D r ) B u y e r shaii no later than three calendar days thereafter provide a 
does not Wrove jhe Loan a ^ ^ o a n ^ e ^ Y ^ ^
 $ r e c e i p f ^ ^ ^ c a n c e l ^ d b y 
copy to Seller ^ e r or S^ler may w,i Cancellation under this Section 2 3(b) (i) if the Notice of Loan 
&en V 2 n ^ rece ,ved by^  Buyer no la'teMhan the Loan Denial Deadline referenced ,n Section 24(d) the Earnest Money 
Denial was received DyB"y«
 f L Q , received by Buyer after that date the Earnest 
S P ? n S s f s n a ^ b e re eased to S . l e r a n S s e l L agrees to accept as Sel.er s exclusive remedy the Earnest Money 
^ n e y D ^ o s r t shall ^ e l ^ e a l
 e c a n c e | a s * v l d e d ,n th (S section 2 3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing 
S o n set forth ,n S e S 2 2(a) Cancelation pursuant to the provisions of any other secUon of this Contract shall be 
90Ve2m4eADDrSa"sSl CoendP,?oVr°Bnuyer s obligation to purchase the Property [X] IS [ ] IS NOT cond.tioned upon the Property 
ooPPor nntlPssthan?the Purchase Price This cond.tion is referred to as the "Appraisal Condition If the Appraisal 
CPond,rn9apptes and he Buye" recedes wnt.en notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for .ess than the 
Cond.tion applies; ancj me e»uy
 c a n c e , t h | S contract by providing a copy of such written notice 
S ' S B K n o " S i thanthree d r a f t e r Buyers receipt of such written notice In the event of a cancellation under this 
<°J,fnn \ 4 S if the NoSce of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later than the Appraisal Deadline referenced in 
S r 24(e the^Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer („) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received by Section 24 e the honest money P
 b e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ S e | | e r ^ ^ a c c e p t a g S e | | e f S 
S s i v e reme y the S n l s t Money Deposit as liquidated damages A failure to cance, as provided in this Section 2 4 
shaSe delmfd a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section 
of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions 
3 SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING 
c c t t i o n w chall take Dlace on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f) or on a date upon which Buyer and 
l e l . S e 5 ? w S i n g ' "Segment" shall occur only when all of the following have been completed (a) Buyer and Sejer 
have stoned and dehvered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract by the 
S P S i escrow instructions or by applicable law (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these 
S m e n t s ( e x S for thTproceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office 
t X form of c S c t e d or cleared funds and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have 
been d ^ r e d by SeHerfo Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds Seller and Buyer 
S S o a v one half (V9 of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing 
o J o c e s s T K L and asses ments for the current year rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at 
Settlement as setforth in this Section Tenant deposits (including but not limited to secunty deposits cleaning deposits 
fndoreoad rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth m this Section shall be 
made I s of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f) unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties 
S h w n t i n g could mclude the settlement statement The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been 
completedI and when all of the following have been completed (.) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by 
me Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the 
office of the county recorder The actions described in parts (.) and (.«) of the preceding sentence shall be completed within 
four calendar days of Settlement 
4 POSSESSION Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within [ ] hours [ ] J days after Closing, 
t ] Other (specify) 
5 CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract 
( ] Seller's Initials
 ( ^ | W e r , s Initials 
The Listing Agent J V l E f i L ^ R A T i D A L J represents M Sel.er [ ] Buyer[ l ^ ^ J ^ l t e ' ' 
The Listing Broker P-OI DWEU RANKFR PREMIER represents M Seller { ] Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller 11 ic u.ou. y —
 a s a (jrruterj Agent, 
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The Selling Agent J E R E M Y J ^ B K l i ^ represents [ ] Seller [X] Buyer [ ] both B u ^ r ^ t e r 
The Selling Broker _ E X U ^ £ O ^ Q £ K ^ H A ^ represents [ ] Seller [X] Buyer [ ] b o t h j u y e ^ 
fi TITLE INSURANCE At Settlement Seller agrees to pay for a standard coverage owner s policy of title insurance 
fns J.nc["Buyer inlhe"amount of the Purchase Price Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer s expense 
T CF. i PR DISCLOSURES No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) Seller shall provide 
to Buyer fhe following documents which are collectively referred to as the Seller Disclosures 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property signed and dated by Seller 
b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance 
r a roov of anv leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing 
d) wn«en notice o?any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or (d) -
zoning code violations and 
(e) Other (specify) 
8 BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS Buyers obligation to purchase 
under this Contract (check applicable boxes) 
(a) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in 
Section 7 
(b) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property 
(c) [ I I S IX] iS NOT conditioned upon Buyer s approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ( Survey") 
(d) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of the cost terms and availability of homeowner s insurance 
coverage for the Property 
(e) [X] IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property (specify) 
_gr£iipss'nn^l Hnmfi & Termite Inspection 
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative then Sections 8 1 8 2 8 3 and 8 4 apply otherwise they do not 
apply The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the 'Evaluations & Inspections " Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-
through inspection under Section 11 
8 1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 
24(c) Buyer shall (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections are 
acceptable to Buyer 
8 2 Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable Buyer may 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline either (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer or (b) provide Seller with wntten notice of objections 
8 3 Failure to Respond If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not (a) cancel 
this Contract as provided in Section 8 2, or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer 
8 4 Response by Seller If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period') in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's objections Except as provided in Section 10 2, Seller may but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
objections If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing wntten notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Penod whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8 4 Buyer s objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer This waiver shall not affect those items warranted in 
Section 10 
9 ADDITIONAL TERMS There [X] ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms If there are 
the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference [ ] Addendum No _J 
[ X ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] Lead Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure is required by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint 
Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law) [ x ] Other 
(specify)
 N o t } c e Q f | n t e r e g t A d d e n d u m 
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10 SELLER W A R R A N T E S 8 ^ ^ f ^ J Y J S s L t Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and 10 1 Cond.t.on of Title Seller represem na
 h o w e v e ^ { ^ {Q ( h e R r o p e r t y 
marketable title to Buyer•* C o s i n g b o r ^ n e J ^ a ^ t y d ° l f r e s t n c y t i o n s 9 C C & R ' s (meaning covenants conditions and 
subject to the following matters of record e a s e m . Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer 
restr.ct.ons) and nghts-of-wa>-andsubgt tcthe contents o J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
under Section 8 Buyer also agrees to take je Property su ,
 n * m e o w n e r s assoc.3t,on dues utilit.es, and other 
pnor to Closing Buyer^agrees to ^ ^ W e £ ? p ? £ a n y ,oan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2 1(c). 
services provided to the P r . 0 ^ r t y f ^ ' ° S ' „ 9 m o r t q a i e S trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's hens, tax Hens and warrants 
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing, all ^ g S s V e n t s and homeowners association dues 
Se.ierwii. c a u s e ^ p a j i curr^ntby ^ ^ ^ s T a t the^roperty w.l. be ,n the following condition ON THE DATE 
S E
^ ^ o V p f r t y S £ ^ b ^ m - S a n a n d freTof demand persona, belongings Any Seller or tenant mov.ng-related 
d a m f b f t h J h e a ' t l n T c l t g ! e ^ ^ f p ^ S ' ^ ^ systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces w,«. 
be in workmq order and fit for their intended purposes, 
fit fonts ^ ^ r p w e . a n d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
 | a n d s c a p , n g | Wl l l b e i n t h e s a m e general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10 3 is separate from the 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan The H ^ ^ n r y
 e c k g b o . A o n e . y e a f H 
warranties provided by Seller under ^ " s 10 J j n a * ,f i n c | u S e d t h e H o m e W a r r a n t y P l a n shall be 
W ! r r a n j l * £ , " ^ i L ^ \ X ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ « V selected by [Xl Buyer [ ] Seller The cost of the Home 
w S t y P.2n S f not exceed ? ^ 0 0 0 and shall & paid & at Settlement by [ ] Buyer
 tX] Seller 
•M W A I K THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time 
11. WALK-THROUGH i N ^ t o
 determ.ne only that the Property is "as represented, meaning that 
conduct a ^ ' ^ " ^ J S f ? " g 4 and 10 2 ("the items") are respect.vely present, repaired/changed as agreed, and 
the items referenced ."!See Jons V » 4 ana ^
 d S e l l e r wl | |. r t 0 settlement, replace, correc or repair the 
,n the warranted condition 1thenews ate
 a
Hpp!lcable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same 
terns or, with * ^ f ^ ^ ^ ^ i S X c J to'daim that an item » not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver 
^ ^ J i S ^ o ^ ^ ^ S t da?e of possession, the .terns as represented 
„
 r u A u r F , n . I R 1 N G TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of 
12. CHANGES DURING I ™ " & * ~ ' ~
 w n t t e n COnSent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made (b) 
t h e f
° w T a ^ ^ improvements "to the Property shall be made or 
undSaten and (df no lurthtr financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made 
«.^.w ^r- c.rwcDQ if Riivpr or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
^ ^ ! ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ SeCh°a.? wa r ran t ^ , or hir authority to do so and to b.nd Buyer and 
Seller 
, ^ . o ! CTIT rnMTRACT This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT, I M S ^ P H y supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations. 
S p S S S b S s . l T a ^ T ^ * ^ 9 s o r c K a d s betwee'n the part.es This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The part.es agree that any d.spute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to th.s Contract 
(check applicable box) 
[ X l MAY AT THE OPTION ^ T H E P A R T ^ ^
 s u b m ( t t e d tQ m e d i a t l o n t h r o u g h a 
first be submitted to medat.on: If thepartes agree to v ^
 o f ^ ^ | f m e d i a t ) o n 
^ ^ ^ S ^ S S S ' ^ ^ S S a^aJabKnJer th.s c'ontLfshall apply Noth.ng .n th.s Sect.on 15 shall proh.b.t 
a^y party from ?eek,ng emergency equ.table relief pend.ng med.at.on 
16 DEFAULT If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect either to reta.n the Earnest Money^epos.t as l.qu.dated damages^ to 
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return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law If Seller defaults in 
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest 
Money Deposit as liquidated damages or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies 
available at law If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon 
demand It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 
2 3(b) 
17 ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees However attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation 
in mediation under Section 15 
18 NOTICES Except as provided in Section 23 all notices required under this Contract must be (a) in writing (b) signed 
by the party giving notice and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract 
19 ABROGATION Except for the provisions of Sections 10 1, 10 2 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing 
20 RISK OF LOSS All risk of Joss to the Property including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract Extensions must be 
agreed to in writing by all parties Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract (a) performance under each Section 
of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5 00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date and (b) 
the term "days" shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the 
timing requirement (i e , Acceptance Notice of Loan Denial, etc ) Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not 
be binding upon title companies, lenders appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to 
in writing by such non-party 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original This 
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other (a) 
signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance, and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other 
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract 
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline tAA Pate) 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline 3 Business Days after Acceptance (Date) 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline F p h m a r y 9 th ? 0 0 7 (Date) 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline NLA (Date) 
(e) Appraisal Deadline F f t h n i a r y 9 th ? 0 0 7 (Date) 
(f) Settlement Deadline Qn or before March 9th ?007 (Date) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If 
Seller does not accept this offer by 5 . 0 0 [ ] AM [x ] PM Mountain Time on J a n u a r y 8 th ? 0 0 7 (Date) 
tbis-offer shalilapse, and the Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer 
(gafe/s Signature) ~~ ' (Offer Date) (Buyer's Signature)/ I " (Offer Date) 
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The later of the above Offer Dates shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference Date" 
(Buyers'Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) J (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHECK ONE: 
[ ] ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified 
above 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
[ ] REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
* * * • * * * * * • * - * • * * - * * * * • * - * * * - * * - * * * * * * * * # • * • * • * * * • * * * * - * * + * * * * - * * * - * 4 - * * * * * * - * * * * * • * • 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures (Fill in applicable 
section below) 
A L acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing CqntjB^baaring all 5ignature; copy ot the foregoing uoj]trj3G>bearing all 5ignatures f/fr&7 / jKL (jXAry^ ///(/<r7 
(Date) - c " / ( ^ r f r a g W W f e ) v ODafej 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Seller's Signature) (Date) 
B I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ ] faxed [ ] mailed I ] hand 
delivered on (Date), postage prepaid, to the [ J Seller [ J Buyer 
Sent/Delivered by (specify) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM 
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Addendum F 
SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
THISSBJ^PINANCWG ADOENDIW b m^i£pirto 
offer Kgt^w pate or January Bfr^q07 . t * t>^ Scy^^r i f^nyWihnn 
thePropertylocatedat, 704 S A f l f t i W I filffilft WaShlngtQDjJ I j feEf f lL^ W^rr^orihbAODENOUM 
tre hereby fnootporsted ee part of the REFC. 
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS* Setoft extension of credit to Buyer shall he evidenced by*, [XJ Note and De*d of Trust 
I I Noitt and AlMndushre Deed of Trust I 10ther! 
L CREDIT TERMS. T>ie tews of the credit documents referred its In Section 1 above era ** follows: 
^SQJJ^JQQ . prhctpa! amc wt of the note (the "Note'); totanrtt atfl.9 % per annum; payable atapproJdmately 
«25lLQfiL—.p^rtJlQJlul - TH* entire unpaid befcno-j of principal phis accrued interest fe due In SfiflLnwrthe 
from date of the Note, Bret payment dueMflyJ fit g0f)7 .. Additional prfacfra! payments, &afloon payments or otter 
term* ae follow:. 
The crecffi documents refena iced in Section 1 of Vifc ADDENDUM wilt contain * due-on-wfo clause fri fevor of Seler, Seller 
agrees to provide to Buyer at Sefttoment: (a) an amortization echadute based on the above terms; <b) a written disdosum of 
the total Interest Buyer will pay to mature of the Note; and (o) the annua! percentage rate on the Note based on loan doling 
ooste. 
1 TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS, In addition to the payments referenced in Section Z above, Buyer shell also be reapoasuWe 
foE (a) properly taxes; <b) homeowners association dues; (c) ipedal assessment*; mi (d) hazard insurance premiums on the 
Property, These obligations will bo paid: [ I rfirectTy t6 S<rfterfE«cfvw Atfent on * monthly baste (X I directly to the 
applicable aounfy treasurer, aaeocurtton, and insurance company as required by those entfKws, 
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 abo*? wlU be made to4. [ J Setter [XI an Escrow Agwrt, If an 
Eaomw AqantTQP fay 6 U Y E R wttl act as Escrow Aq*r& and will be responsible for disbursing payments 
on any underiytng mortgage or deed of true* (the "underlying mortgage*) and to the Seller. Cost pf eetting up the escrow account 
shall be paid by. 1 1 Buyer ( I Setter [XI «rplft evenly between the partfes 
6. LATC PAYWENT/PREPAT'fteNT* Any payment not made within j 5 days after it Is due is sub]** to a late chenjft 
of $Nft o r .6 -u. W of tho Installment due, whichever to greater. Amounts in defiivrtt shall bear InfAfesl fit & rata 
offi ^ per annum All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penalty. 
fc DUEON-SAl^- *s part of the Seller Dtedc^esreie^^ 
of the underlying mortgage, the rtote secured (hereby, and the atm>nWIo<t schedule. Buyera obftgafion to purchase under this 
Contract I* conditioned upon Buyer's epproVal of the content of thoee documents, tn accordance with section e of tho REPC 
If the frotdtfr of the imdedytng mortgage ctfts the loan due GB a result of thte tartsactloni Buyer agrees to discharge the 
underiymg loan as required by the mortgage tender, tn such event, Setter1* remaining eautty shall be prfd iu provided in the 
credit documents. 
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provide to Setter, as e wquJrwdpart of this ADD£NDUMt the attached BuyerRnenofel 
Information Sheet euyer may use the Buyer Financial trtfwmation Sheet Approved by ttw Reat Eetate Commtesioh and the 
Ptfmm QenGtafs Offtaa, or may provide comparaWe written Infemietlon in a dWteront format, together with such additional 
Information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer W WILL [ ] WILL NOT provide Seller i<tth copies of IRS rctwm? for the 
t#o preceding tax years. Buyer «*nowledgee that sefler may contact Buyer's current etnjHoyer for vsrlficatfon of eniploynient 
aa rapretented by Buyer in $* Buyer Financial Information Sheet 
8. SELLER APPROVAL By the Soil* Dbcloeure Deadline referenced in Section 24<b) of the REPC, Buyer ehall provide to 
6eller, at Buyer's expense, a aarent cwflt report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use trie omdit 
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 0 a t e 
report and the Information referenced ta Secfiun 7 of this Addendum ClBuy*r Disclosures'1) to evaluate tha cfedit-*A/orth!rraa8 of 
Buyer, 
M Seller Review, 9y the Evaluation* & Inspection* Deadline referenced In Section 24(c) of me R f f C , SaBar «h*B review 
the credit report a*td thg Buyer D<aeto*urea te ilsiermine iftha oontent of the taedlt report and the Buyaf Dfccteuraa, it 
sooepta&la, ffthe contort of meatxftnaportortrttB^^ 
(a) pwWe wrtten ob}ee«ona to Buyer ae provided ft Secflon B2 of tht$ ADDENDUM; or (b) Immediately cancel tlie REPC by 
pnMding wridan notfce to Buyer BY the EvfihiaHaca & inspection* Deadfrw referenced in Sedlon 24<c) of the REPC, The 
fcroterage, Upon reoe|jt of a oapy of Senate written nofloe of canoeflatkffl, tfiafl return to Buyer tfie Eameat Money Deposit 
8.2 Seller Objection*, If Sailer does hot immediately cancel the R%t>C as provided above, Seller may, by the Evaluations 
& Inspections Deadline referenced in Section 2^e) of the REPC, provide Buyer wfth written objection*. Buyer and Seller ahaft 
b«v* eeven calendar daye after Buyer's roadpt of the obfeofcone (the Ttespon©© Period1) in wnlch fo egnse h writing upon the 
manner of resolving Seta** objection*, Buyar may, but shall not be required to, resohfe Soto's ohjea&m* If Seier and Buyer 
have not agread fa vvrWng upon the manner of reeoMng Saitoh objections, Salter may cancel the REPC by ptotfettng written 
nofic^to Buyer no later than thna* caJendor^ay^atbrexpItaflonoftu^RGi^onsePtrlod The Brokerage upon receipt of a copy 
of Seller's written notice of cancellation, sfiaB return to 8uyfcr \ht Earnest Money Deposit 
6*3 Failure to Object tf Soller does not deliver a written objection w Buyer regardaig the credit report of a Buyer 
Dfeclosiire by the Evaluation A l n a ^ ^ 
in Seotfons 8_1 or 6,2 of this ADDENDUM* the credit report end Buyer Ofectoeurw w3l be deemed approved by Salter. 
9, TITLB INSURANCE* Buyer lX\ SHALL [ J SHALL NOT provide to Seler a lender** policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the fodobtednnee to the Seller, and «ta!f pay for auoh polfoy at Settlement 
tO. DISCLOSURE OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBER* By no later than Sfttttanerit, Buyer and Seller shall disdcao to 
each othor their respective Soda) Security Numbers or other appfoabie tax Identification numbers so that they may comply wfth 
federal tews on reportinj mortgage "*fWte$t In filings wrlh the Internal Revenue Servtee, 
To the extant the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any pcwialons of the REPC, Including all prior addtftda and 
counteroffer, these terms shall oahtrol All otharteeme of the REPC, Including ell prior addenda ahd counteroffers, not modified 
by this ADDENDUM «haH remain the came, [X I Seller ( J Buy«r«hall have until fiyQQ f 1 A M pfl PM Mountain 
H m o an J a n u a r y flT 2 0 0 7 _.. (Date), to accept the tarme of Wa SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM in accordance with 
SeOfcq 2 3 / f toe «EPC> Unless GO acceptad, tfie offer ae eat forth In this SBXEH FINANCING ADDENDUM shall tapaa. j^f j * Unless GO acceptad, tfie offei 
/'&WIAA 
] Settw signature r _ ' (Da<«) (T»n« v Sodal security Number 
iyerjn^fedter^gnattira (Date) (Hmo) v t ) ^ Bu r  f elt r ^ ture ( t ) (Tir )  Sotawl Security Number 
ACOeWAM^OOUNTEROfVER/RalEOTtON 
CHECK ON& 
{ ] ACCEPTANCB; [ 1 Seller! J euytr hereby accept these terms, 
COUNTfi&OFFH*: t I Seller ( J Buy*r presente as a counteroffer the termc eet forth on the attached ADDENDUM 
NO. JL, yj 
/w Sijnalure) ^ ~ " ~ (Date) (Time) (Sicnaturej (Date) gi«») 
[ 1 REJECTION: [ 1 Seller I 1 Buyer reject the foregoing SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM. 
r S m n a ^ ) ' (Dad) (Time) (Si jnAw) (Datfe) (Time) 
P«fle Z of 2 pagoG ^ I fer 1 * Initial^ Date Buyer"« m t t r a l ^ ^ ^ _ O a t e ^ ^ ? 
Addendum G 
Michael F. Leavitt (9476) 
DURHAM JONES & PDMEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Thiid Floor 
St George, Utah 84770 
Phone:(435)674-0400 
Fax:(435)628-1610 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and 
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
V 
ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual, 
Defendant 
ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No 070500581 
Judge James L Shumate 
The Court held a heaiing on cioss-motions foi partial summary judgment in the above-
caplioned mattei on Octobei 11, 2007 Plaintiffs were lepiesented by Michael Leavitt of the law 
fiim of Duiham Jones & Pinegai Defendant was represented by Nathan Doiius of the law fiim 
of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deeie The Couit reviewed the memoianda submitted by the 
parties and heard argument 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACT 
Based upon the aigumeuts of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there rs 
no dispute as tc the foVwing material facts* 
STG_28041 1 ] 
1 Defendant, Angela Johnson, ('"Defendant") is the ownei of pioperty located at 
704 Soxith Anasazi Ciicle, Washington, Utah - the pioperty at issue in this case ("Residence") 
2 Defendant listed the Residence foi sale on oi about December 1, 2006, 
advertising the fact that she was willing to seller-finance the transaction at 4 9% pei annum 
3 On oi about January 6, 2007, Plaintiffs, Scott Wilson and Tiffany Wilson 
("Plaintiffs") offeied to puichase the Residence from Defendant, offeiing to pay $1,100,000 with 
Plaintiff paying $20,000 in earnest money and $90,000 at closing, foi a total of $ 110,000 down 
and Defendant sellei-financing $990,000 
4 The Plaintiffs' offei was made on a standard Real Estate Puichase Contract form 
appioved by the State of Utah, Division of Real Estate 
5 Ihe initial offer specified that the puichase piice would be paid through sellei 
financing and contained the following language: 
Theie [X] are [ ] are not addenda to this Contract containing 
additional terms.. If theie are, the teims of the following addenda 
are incorporated into this Contract by this reference [ ] Addendum 
No I [X] Sellei Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan 
Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum [ ] Lead-Based Paint 
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some tiansactions this 
disclosuie is iequiied by law) [ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in 
some tiansactions this addendum is iequiied by law) [X] Othei 
(specify) Notice of Inteiest Addendum. 
6 Along with the initial offer, and to specify the teims of the sellei financing, the 
Plaintiffs included a sellei financing addendum ("Seller Financing Addendum") that specified 
that Defendant would provide seller financing foi the Residence in the principal amount of 
$990,000 00 at 4 9% per annum for 360 months, with the first payment to begin May 1, 2007 
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7 On 01 about January 8,2007, Defendant executed a counteioffei, listed as 
Addendum No 2, agreeing to accept $1,200,000 00 foi the purchase of the Residence and 
"requiring a 72 houi time clause/option to keep the house on the market" 
8 Addendum No, 2 specifically states: 
to the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict 
with any provision of the REPC, including all prior addenda and 
counter offers, these terms shall control All other teims of the 
REPC, including all prioi addenda and counteroffers, not modified 
by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. 
9 Defendant's counteioffer made no mention of the Seller Financing Addendum, 
and made no changes to any terms of the original offer, other than those noted in paragraph 7 
above. 
10 On that same date, the Plaintiffs executed Addendum No 3, counter -offering the 
following: (a) purchase price of $1,150,000, (b) in lieu of 72 houi clause, settlement to be 2-23-
07; (c) earnest money of $20,000 to be non-refundable and released to seller on 2-10*07; and (d) 
all other terms and conditions to remain the same 
11 On the same date, Defendant signed both the REPC and Addendum No 3, but 
did not sign the Seller Financing Addendum 
12. In spite of the changes in the ultimate price from Plaintiffs' initial offer to the 
final agreement, the parties did not change the language of the REPC or the Seller Financing 
Addendum, which stated that Defendant would finance $990,000 as the seller and that Plaintiffs 
would pay a total of $ 110,000 as a down payment 
13 The parties agreed to close on the sale of the Residence by February 23, 2007 
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14 On or about February 10, 2007, Defendant received the $20,000 earnest money 
deposit check and negotiated it 
15 Plaintiffs closed their end of the transaction on February 23, 2007 by signing, 
among other documents, an All-inclusive Trust Deed in the amount of $1,035,000 00 and 
bringing $98,625 42 to the closing officer 
16. At closing on February 23, 2007, Defendant did not sign the HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement because she did not agree with the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum 
17 The transaction did not close on February 23, 200 7 
18 Plaintiffs caused a Notice of Interest to be recorded against the Property after the 
transaction did not close 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of 
law: 
1 A justiciable controversy and actual conflict exists between Plaintiffs and 
Defendant with respect to whether Defendant is bound by the terms of the Seller Financing 
Addendum, specifically whether she agreed to finance the purchase of the Residence at 4 9% per 
annum 
2 Plaintiffs and Defendant are adverse to each other with respect to this controversy 
and conflict 
3 Plaintiffs and Defendant each have an interest to protect with respect to this issue 
4 The issue \s ripe foi judicial review 
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5 As a result of Defendant's signature to Addendum No 3, her acceptance of 
Addendum No 3, and hei transmission of hei acceptance of Addendum No 3 to Plaintiffs, 
Defendant agieed to the terms of the REPC and all addenda and coimteroffeis that were not 
changed by the terms of Addendum No 3 
6 These enforceable terms include the fact that Defendant agreed to seller-finance 
the transaction at 4 9% per annum, as reflected in the Seller Financing Addendum 
7- Plaintiffs and Defendant were bound by the terms of the REPC, Seller Financing 
Addendum, and Addendum No 3 
8 Plaintiffs were not in breach of the REPC, Seller Financing Addendum, or 
Addendum No 3, and peiformed in accordance with those documents 
9. The Notice of Interest that Plaintiffs caused to be recorded against the Pioperty 
was authorized by Utah Code Ann 57-9-4, and therefore, is not a wrongful lien as stated in Utah 
Code Ann Title 38, Chapter 9 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADIUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADIUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs is DENIED 
STG 28041 \ 5 
DATED this b day of 
Approved as to form: 
Bennett mellei lohnson & Deere 
£an A Monsor 
Jatha^S Doiius 
vAtfx5fneys foi Defendant 
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2008 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UIAH 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I heieby certify that an unsigned copy of the foiegoing Order Granting Partial 
Summary Judgment was served this uP day of 1\YC{ I 2008, via U S Mail, postage 
prepaid upon the following-
Sean A Monson 
Nathan S Doiius 
BENNETT, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE 
3165 E. Millrock Drive, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
Legal Assistant 
STG 28041 $ 7 
Addendum H 
Michael F. Leavitt (9476) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, Third Floor: 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Phone: (435) 674-0400 
Fax:(435)628-1610 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
41483.04 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCOTT WILSON, an individual, and 
TIFFANY WILSON, an individual, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
ANGELA JOHNSON, an individual, 
Defendant. 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Case No. 070500581 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-
captiorted matter on May 11, 2008. Plaintiffs were represented by Michael Leavitt of the law 
firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar, RC Defendant was represented by Sean Monson of the law 
firni of Bennett, Tueller, Johnson & Deere. The Court reviewed the memoranda submitted by 
tne parties and heard argument. 
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FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACT 
Based upon the arguments of the parties and the memoranda, the Court finds that there is 
no genuine dispute of the following material facts: 
1 v This Court has previously determined that the Real Estate Purchase Contract 
("REPC") signed by the Plaintiffs and Defendant (collectively, "Parties") on or about January 8, 
2007, including all addenda and counteroffers, not changed by the terms of a document entitled 
Addendum No. 3, was a binding agreement between the Parties. 
2. According to the REPC, the parties agreed to close the transaction on February 
23, 2007. 
3. On February 23,2007, the Wilsons closed their end of the transaction, signed all 
documents, and deposited the appropriate funds with the title company. 
4. On the same date, Defendant went to the title company and signed most of the 
closing documents, but refused to sign the HUD-1 Settlement Statement that was necessary to 
close the transaction, and therefore, the transaction did not close. 
5. The REPC specifically states that in the event the seller defaults, in addition to 
return of the earnest money deposit, buyer may elect either to accept from seller a sum equal to 
the earnest money deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue seller to specifically enforce the 
contract to, or pursue other remedies available at law. 
6. The RJEPC also grants the prevailing party, in the event of litigation or binding 
arbitration to enforce the REPC, an award of costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
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7. Plaintiffs were the buyers in the REPC and paid an earnest money deposit of 
$20,000, which has been retained by Defendant, the seller identified in the REPC. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the above undisputed facts, the Court makes the following conclusions of 
law: 
1. To prove breach of contract, a complaining party must show: (1) the existence of 
a valid and enforceable contract, (2) performance by the Plaintiff; (3) breach of express 
performance by the defendant; and (4) damages to the Plaiiitiff resulting from the breach. See 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrooke & McDonough. 2003 UT 9, Tf32, 70 P.3d 17. 
2. In the instant case, the REPC is a valid and enforceable agreement. 
3. Plaintiffs fully performed their obligations stated in the REPC. 
4. Defendant failed to perform her obligations in the REPC by failing to sign all 
documents necessary to effectuate closing on the date agreed by the Parties. 
5. Plaintiffs were damaged by Defendant's failure to perform. 
6. Plaintiffs have elected their remedy for compensatory damages by seeking a 
return of their earnest money deposit of $20,000, and an amount equal to that of $20,000, for 
total compensatory damages of $40,000. 
7. Plaintiffs are the prevailing party in this action, and therefore, are entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined. 
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that, Plaintiffs have 
judgment against Defendant Angela Johnson in the amount of $40,000, plus interest at the post-
judgment rate of 5.42% per annum until paid. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs are awarded 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined by affidavit of counsel for 
Plaintiffs, and that this judgment may be augmented to include additional reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs necessarily expended in the execution of this judgment. 
DATED this ^ I day of ij ft ^1 2009. 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE JAMES L. S t ^ A T l 
District Court Judge \ \ 
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I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT was 
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Sean A. Monson 
Nathan S. Dorius 
BENNETT, TUELLER, JOHNSON & DEERE 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
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